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132 lines
5.3 KiB
132 lines
5.3 KiB
// Copyright (c) 2018-2022, The Monero Project
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//
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// All rights reserved.
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//
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// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
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// permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
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//
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// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
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// conditions and the following disclaimer.
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//
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// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
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// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
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// materials provided with the distribution.
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//
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// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be
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// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
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// prior written permission.
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//
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// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
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// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
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// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
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// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
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// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
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// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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#include "gtest/gtest.h"
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#include "crypto/crypto.h"
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extern "C" {
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#include "crypto/crypto-ops.h"
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}
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#include "crypto/hash.h"
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#include <boost/algorithm/string.hpp>
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static inline unsigned char *operator &(crypto::ec_point &point) {
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return &reinterpret_cast<unsigned char &>(point);
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}
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static inline unsigned char *operator &(crypto::ec_scalar &scalar) {
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return &reinterpret_cast<unsigned char &>(scalar);
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}
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TEST(tx_proof, prove_verify_v2)
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{
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crypto::secret_key r;
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crypto::random32_unbiased(&r);
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// A = aG
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// B = bG
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crypto::secret_key a,b;
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crypto::public_key A,B;
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crypto::generate_keys(A, a, a, false);
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crypto::generate_keys(B, b, b, false);
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// R_B = rB
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crypto::public_key R_B;
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ge_p3 B_p3;
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ASSERT_EQ(ge_frombytes_vartime(&B_p3,&B), 0);
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ge_p2 R_B_p2;
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ge_scalarmult(&R_B_p2, &unwrap(r), &B_p3);
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ge_tobytes(&R_B, &R_B_p2);
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// R_G = rG
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crypto::public_key R_G;
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ASSERT_EQ(ge_frombytes_vartime(&B_p3,&B), 0);
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ge_p3 R_G_p3;
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ge_scalarmult_base(&R_G_p3, &unwrap(r));
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ge_p3_tobytes(&R_G, &R_G_p3);
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// D = rA
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crypto::public_key D;
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ge_p3 A_p3;
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ASSERT_EQ(ge_frombytes_vartime(&A_p3,&A), 0);
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ge_p2 D_p2;
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ge_scalarmult(&D_p2, &unwrap(r), &A_p3);
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ge_tobytes(&D, &D_p2);
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crypto::signature sig;
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// Message data
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crypto::hash prefix_hash;
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char data[] = "hash input";
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crypto::cn_fast_hash(data,sizeof(data)-1,prefix_hash);
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// Generate/verify valid v1 proof with standard address
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crypto::generate_tx_proof_v1(prefix_hash, R_G, A, boost::none, D, r, sig);
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ASSERT_TRUE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_G, A, boost::none, D, sig, 1));
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// Generate/verify valid v1 proof with subaddress
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crypto::generate_tx_proof_v1(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, D, r, sig);
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ASSERT_TRUE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, D, sig, 1));
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// Generate/verify valid v2 proof with standard address
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crypto::generate_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_G, A, boost::none, D, r, sig);
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ASSERT_TRUE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_G, A, boost::none, D, sig, 2));
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// Generate/verify valid v2 proof with subaddress
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crypto::generate_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, D, r, sig);
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ASSERT_TRUE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, D, sig, 2));
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// Try to verify valid v2 proofs as v1 proof (bad)
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crypto::generate_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_G, A, boost::none, D, r, sig);
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ASSERT_FALSE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_G, A, boost::none, D, sig, 1));
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crypto::generate_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, D, r, sig);
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ASSERT_FALSE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, D, sig, 1));
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// Randomly-distributed test points
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crypto::secret_key evil_a, evil_b, evil_d, evil_r;
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crypto::public_key evil_A, evil_B, evil_D, evil_R;
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crypto::generate_keys(evil_A, evil_a, evil_a, false);
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crypto::generate_keys(evil_B, evil_b, evil_b, false);
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crypto::generate_keys(evil_D, evil_d, evil_d, false);
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crypto::generate_keys(evil_R, evil_r, evil_r, false);
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// Selectively choose bad point in v2 proof (bad)
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crypto::generate_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, D, r, sig);
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ASSERT_FALSE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, evil_R, A, B, D, sig, 2));
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ASSERT_FALSE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, evil_A, B, D, sig, 2));
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ASSERT_FALSE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, A, evil_B, D, sig, 2));
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ASSERT_FALSE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, evil_D, sig, 2));
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// Try to verify valid v1 proofs as v2 proof (bad)
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crypto::generate_tx_proof_v1(prefix_hash, R_G, A, boost::none, D, r, sig);
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ASSERT_FALSE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_G, A, boost::none, D, sig, 2));
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crypto::generate_tx_proof_v1(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, D, r, sig);
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ASSERT_FALSE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, D, sig, 2));
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}
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