- This addresses https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20190226.txt (CVE: 2019-1559) which impacted all versions of openssl-1.0.
Note that this does not address CVE-2019-1543 (https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-1543), which impacts all versions of openssl 1.1 through 1.1.0j and 1.1.1b.
The above (1.1) is patched in openssl, where it was marked as low severity. Similar issues possibly present in monero, should be looked into w.r.t. CVE-2019-1543.
3f612cda Changed odd bullet point to low level header (Rohaq)
af9bc4ec Used subeaders to avoid slightly wonky looking formatting (Rohaq)
1873af35 Made code block usage consistent across all .md files (Rohaq)
68103075 Updated Copyright notice (Rohaq)
39bd157f Added Table of Contents to main README.md (Rohaq)
add two RSA based ciphers for Windows/depends compatibility
also enforce server cipher ordering
also set ECDH to auto because vtnerd says it is good :)
When built with the depends system, openssl does not include any
cipher on the current whitelist, so add this one, which fixes the
problem, and does seem sensible.
It can allocate a lot when getting a lot of connections
(in particular, the stress test on windows apparently pushes
that memory to actual use, rather than just allocated)
When closing connections due to exiting, the IO service is
already gone, so the data exchange needed for a gracious SSL
shutdown cannot happen. We just close the socket in that case.
An override for the wallet to daemon connection is provided, but not for
other SSL contexts. The intent is to prevent users from supplying a
system CA as the "user" whitelisted certificate, which is less secure
since the key is controlled by a third party.
This allows "chain" certificates to be used with the fingerprint
whitelist option. A user can get a system-ca signature as backup while
clients explicitly whitelist the server certificate. The user specified
CA can also be combined with fingerprint whitelisting.
The former has the same behavior with single self signed certificates
while allowing the server to have separate short-term authentication
keys with long-term authorization keys.
If the verification mode is `system_ca`, clients will now do hostname
verification. Thus, only certificates from expected hostnames are
allowed when SSL is enabled. This can be overridden by forcible setting
the SSL mode to autodetect.
Clients will also send the hostname even when `system_ca` is not being
performed. This leaks possible metadata, but allows servers providing
multiple hostnames to respond with the correct certificate. One example
is cloudflare, which getmonero.org is currently using.
If SSL is "enabled" via command line without specifying a fingerprint or
certificate, the system CA list is checked for server verification and
_now_ fails the handshake if that check fails. This change was made to
remain consistent with standard SSL/TLS client behavior. This can still
be overridden by using the allow any certificate flag.
If the SSL behavior is autodetect, the system CA list is still checked
but a warning is logged if this fails. The stream is not rejected
because a re-connect will be attempted - its better to have an
unverified encrypted stream than an unverified + unencrypted stream.
Using `verify_peer` on server side requests a certificate from the
client. If no certificate is provided, the server silently accepts the
connection and rejects if the client sends an unexpected certificate.
Adding `verify_fail_if_no_cert` has no affect on client and for server
requires that the peer sends a certificate or fails the handshake. This
is the desired behavior when the user specifies a fingerprint or CA file.
moneromooo-monero
Howard Chu
who-biz
xiphon
Lee Clagett
wowario
Riccardo Spagni
luigi1111
Rohaq
Florian
Dusan Klinec