Updates InProofV1, OutProofV1, and ReserveProofV1 to new V2 variants that include all public proof parameters in Schnorr challenges, along with hash function domain separators. Includes new randomized unit tests.
Sarang Noether
4 years ago
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5d850dde99
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// Copyright (c) 2018, The Monero Project
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//
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// All rights reserved.
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//
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// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
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// permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
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//
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// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
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// conditions and the following disclaimer.
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//
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// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
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// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
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// materials provided with the distribution.
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//
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// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be
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// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
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// prior written permission.
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//
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// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
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// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
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// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
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// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
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// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
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// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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#include "gtest/gtest.h"
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#include "crypto/crypto.h"
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extern "C" {
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#include "crypto/crypto-ops.h"
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}
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#include "crypto/hash.h"
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#include <boost/algorithm/string.hpp>
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static inline unsigned char *operator &(crypto::ec_point &point) {
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return &reinterpret_cast<unsigned char &>(point);
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}
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static inline unsigned char *operator &(crypto::ec_scalar &scalar) {
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return &reinterpret_cast<unsigned char &>(scalar);
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}
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TEST(tx_proof, prove_verify_v2)
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{
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crypto::secret_key r;
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crypto::random32_unbiased(&r);
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// A = aG
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// B = bG
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crypto::secret_key a,b;
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crypto::public_key A,B;
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crypto::generate_keys(A, a, a, false);
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crypto::generate_keys(B, b, b, false);
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// R_B = rB
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crypto::public_key R_B;
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ge_p3 B_p3;
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ge_frombytes_vartime(&B_p3,&B);
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ge_p2 R_B_p2;
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ge_scalarmult(&R_B_p2, &unwrap(r), &B_p3);
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ge_tobytes(&R_B, &R_B_p2);
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// R_G = rG
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crypto::public_key R_G;
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ge_frombytes_vartime(&B_p3,&B);
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ge_p3 R_G_p3;
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ge_scalarmult_base(&R_G_p3, &unwrap(r));
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ge_p3_tobytes(&R_G, &R_G_p3);
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// D = rA
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crypto::public_key D;
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ge_p3 A_p3;
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ge_frombytes_vartime(&A_p3,&A);
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ge_p2 D_p2;
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ge_scalarmult(&D_p2, &unwrap(r), &A_p3);
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ge_tobytes(&D, &D_p2);
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crypto::signature sig;
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// Message data
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crypto::hash prefix_hash;
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char data[] = "hash input";
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crypto::cn_fast_hash(data,sizeof(data)-1,prefix_hash);
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// Generate/verify valid v1 proof with standard address
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crypto::generate_tx_proof_v1(prefix_hash, R_G, A, boost::none, D, r, sig);
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ASSERT_TRUE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_G, A, boost::none, D, sig, 1));
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// Generate/verify valid v1 proof with subaddress
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crypto::generate_tx_proof_v1(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, D, r, sig);
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ASSERT_TRUE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, D, sig, 1));
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// Generate/verify valid v2 proof with standard address
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crypto::generate_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_G, A, boost::none, D, r, sig);
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ASSERT_TRUE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_G, A, boost::none, D, sig, 2));
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// Generate/verify valid v2 proof with subaddress
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crypto::generate_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, D, r, sig);
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ASSERT_TRUE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, D, sig, 2));
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// Try to verify valid v2 proofs as v1 proof (bad)
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crypto::generate_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_G, A, boost::none, D, r, sig);
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ASSERT_FALSE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_G, A, boost::none, D, sig, 1));
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crypto::generate_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, D, r, sig);
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ASSERT_FALSE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, D, sig, 1));
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// Randomly-distributed test points
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crypto::secret_key evil_a, evil_b, evil_d, evil_r;
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crypto::public_key evil_A, evil_B, evil_D, evil_R;
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crypto::generate_keys(evil_A, evil_a, evil_a, false);
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crypto::generate_keys(evil_B, evil_b, evil_b, false);
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crypto::generate_keys(evil_D, evil_d, evil_d, false);
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crypto::generate_keys(evil_R, evil_r, evil_r, false);
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// Selectively choose bad point in v2 proof (bad)
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crypto::generate_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, D, r, sig);
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ASSERT_FALSE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, evil_R, A, B, D, sig, 2));
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ASSERT_FALSE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, evil_A, B, D, sig, 2));
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ASSERT_FALSE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, A, evil_B, D, sig, 2));
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ASSERT_FALSE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, evil_D, sig, 2));
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// Try to verify valid v1 proofs as v2 proof (bad)
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crypto::generate_tx_proof_v1(prefix_hash, R_G, A, boost::none, D, r, sig);
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ASSERT_FALSE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_G, A, boost::none, D, sig, 2));
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crypto::generate_tx_proof_v1(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, D, r, sig);
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ASSERT_FALSE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, D, sig, 2));
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}
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