diff --git a/src/cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_boost_serialization.h b/src/cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_boost_serialization.h index 143133163..0725a2bb8 100644 --- a/src/cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_boost_serialization.h +++ b/src/cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_boost_serialization.h @@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ namespace boost a & x.type; if (x.type == rct::RCTTypeNull) return; - if (x.type != rct::RCTTypeFull && x.type != rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof && x.type != rct::RCTTypeSimple && x.type != rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) + if (x.type != rct::RCTTypeFull && x.type != rct::RCTTypeSimple && x.type != rct::RCTTypeBulletproof) throw boost::archive::archive_exception(boost::archive::archive_exception::other_exception, "Unsupported rct type"); // a & x.message; message is not serialized, as it can be reconstructed from the tx data // a & x.mixRing; mixRing is not serialized, as it can be reconstructed from the offsets @@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ namespace boost a & x.type; if (x.type == rct::RCTTypeNull) return; - if (x.type != rct::RCTTypeFull && x.type != rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof && x.type != rct::RCTTypeSimple && x.type != rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) + if (x.type != rct::RCTTypeFull && x.type != rct::RCTTypeSimple && x.type != rct::RCTTypeBulletproof) throw boost::archive::archive_exception(boost::archive::archive_exception::other_exception, "Unsupported rct type"); // a & x.message; message is not serialized, as it can be reconstructed from the tx data // a & x.mixRing; mixRing is not serialized, as it can be reconstructed from the offsets @@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ namespace boost if (x.p.rangeSigs.empty()) a & x.p.bulletproofs; a & x.p.MGs; - if (x.type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) + if (x.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof) a & x.p.pseudoOuts; } } diff --git a/src/cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_format_utils.cpp b/src/cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_format_utils.cpp index 428be1c9c..524cbf7ae 100644 --- a/src/cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_format_utils.cpp +++ b/src/cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_format_utils.cpp @@ -139,18 +139,26 @@ namespace cryptonote if (!base_only) { - const bool bulletproof = rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof; + const bool bulletproof = rct::is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type); if (bulletproof) { - if (rv.p.bulletproofs.size() != tx.vout.size()) + if (rct::n_bulletproof_amounts(rv.p.bulletproofs) != tx.vout.size()) { LOG_PRINT_L1("Failed to parse transaction from blob, bad bulletproofs size in tx " << get_transaction_hash(tx)); return false; } - for (size_t n = 0; n < rv.outPk.size(); ++n) + size_t idx = 0; + for (size_t n = 0; n < rv.p.bulletproofs.size(); ++n) { - rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V.resize(1); - rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V[0] = rv.outPk[n].mask; + //rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V.resize(1); + //rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V[0] = rv.outPk[n].mask; + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.bulletproofs[n].L.size() >= 6, false, "Bad bulletproofs L size"); // at least 64 bits + const size_t n_amounts = rct::n_bulletproof_amounts(rv.p.bulletproofs[n]); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(idx + n_amounts <= rv.outPk.size(), false, "Internal error filling out V"); + rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V.resize(n_amounts); + rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V.clear(); + for (size_t i = 0; i < n_amounts; ++i) + rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V[i] = rv.outPk[idx++].mask; } } } diff --git a/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain.cpp b/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain.cpp index 0800409b5..9beb28fbd 100644 --- a/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain.cpp +++ b/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain.cpp @@ -2597,7 +2597,7 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_outputs(const transaction& tx, tx_verification_context // from v8, allow bulletproofs if (hf_version < 8) { - const bool bulletproof = tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof || tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof; + const bool bulletproof = rct::is_rct_bulletproof(tx.rct_signatures.type); if (bulletproof || !tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.empty()) { MERROR("Bulletproofs are not allowed before v8"); @@ -2631,7 +2631,7 @@ bool Blockchain::expand_transaction_2(transaction &tx, const crypto::hash &tx_pr rv.message = rct::hash2rct(tx_prefix_hash); // mixRing - full and simple store it in opposite ways - if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFull || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof) + if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFull) { CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!pubkeys.empty() && !pubkeys[0].empty(), false, "empty pubkeys"); rv.mixRing.resize(pubkeys[0].size()); @@ -2646,7 +2646,7 @@ bool Blockchain::expand_transaction_2(transaction &tx, const crypto::hash &tx_pr } } } - else if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) + else if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof) { CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!pubkeys.empty() && !pubkeys[0].empty(), false, "empty pubkeys"); rv.mixRing.resize(pubkeys.size()); @@ -2665,14 +2665,14 @@ bool Blockchain::expand_transaction_2(transaction &tx, const crypto::hash &tx_pr } // II - if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFull || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof) + if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFull) { rv.p.MGs.resize(1); rv.p.MGs[0].II.resize(tx.vin.size()); for (size_t n = 0; n < tx.vin.size(); ++n) rv.p.MGs[0].II[n] = rct::ki2rct(boost::get(tx.vin[n]).k_image); } - else if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) + else if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof) { CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.MGs.size() == tx.vin.size(), false, "Bad MGs size"); for (size_t n = 0; n < tx.vin.size(); ++n) @@ -2938,7 +2938,7 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_inputs(transaction& tx, tx_verification_context &tvc, return false; } case rct::RCTTypeSimple: - case rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof: + case rct::RCTTypeBulletproof: { // check all this, either reconstructed (so should really pass), or not { @@ -2996,7 +2996,6 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_inputs(transaction& tx, tx_verification_context &tvc, break; } case rct::RCTTypeFull: - case rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof: { // check all this, either reconstructed (so should really pass), or not { @@ -3061,7 +3060,7 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_inputs(transaction& tx, tx_verification_context &tvc, } // for bulletproofs, check they're only multi-output after v8 - if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) + if (rct::is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type)) { if (hf_version < 8) { diff --git a/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.cpp b/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.cpp index 4928bb528..f1a666814 100644 --- a/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.cpp +++ b/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.cpp @@ -692,26 +692,142 @@ namespace cryptonote return false; } + // resolve outPk references in rct txes + // outPk aren't the only thing that need resolving for a fully resolved tx, + // but outPk (1) are needed now to check range proof semantics, and + // (2) do not need access to the blockchain to find data + if (tx.version >= 2) + { + rct::rctSig &rv = tx.rct_signatures; + if (rv.outPk.size() != tx.vout.size()) + { + LOG_PRINT_L1("WRONG TRANSACTION BLOB, Bad outPk size in tx " << tx_hash << ", rejected"); + tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true; + return false; + } + for (size_t n = 0; n < tx.rct_signatures.outPk.size(); ++n) + rv.outPk[n].dest = rct::pk2rct(boost::get(tx.vout[n].target).key); + + const bool bulletproof = rct::is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type); + if (bulletproof) + { + if (rct::n_bulletproof_amounts(rv.p.bulletproofs) != tx.vout.size()) + { + LOG_PRINT_L1("WRONG TRANSACTION BLOB, Bad bulletproofs size in tx " << tx_hash << ", rejected"); + tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true; + return false; + } + size_t idx = 0; + for (size_t n = 0; n < rv.p.bulletproofs.size(); ++n) + { + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.bulletproofs[n].L.size() >= 6, false, "Bad bulletproofs L size"); // at least 64 bits + const size_t n_amounts = rct::n_bulletproof_amounts(rv.p.bulletproofs[n]); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(idx + n_amounts <= rv.outPk.size(), false, "Internal error filling out V"); + rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V.clear(); + for (size_t i = 0; i < n_amounts; ++i) + rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V.push_back(rv.outPk[idx++].mask); + } + } + } + return true; + } + //----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + void core::set_semantics_failed(const crypto::hash &tx_hash) + { + LOG_PRINT_L1("WRONG TRANSACTION BLOB, Failed to check tx " << tx_hash << " semantic, rejected"); + bad_semantics_txes_lock.lock(); + bad_semantics_txes[0].insert(tx_hash); + if (bad_semantics_txes[0].size() >= BAD_SEMANTICS_TXES_MAX_SIZE) + { + std::swap(bad_semantics_txes[0], bad_semantics_txes[1]); + bad_semantics_txes[0].clear(); + } + bad_semantics_txes_lock.unlock(); + } + //----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + bool core::handle_incoming_tx_accumulated_batch(std::vector &tx_info, bool keeped_by_block) + { + bool ret = true; if (keeped_by_block && get_blockchain_storage().is_within_compiled_block_hash_area()) { MTRACE("Skipping semantics check for tx kept by block in embedded hash area"); + return true; } - else if(!check_tx_semantic(tx, keeped_by_block)) + + std::vector rvv; + for (size_t n = 0; n < tx_info.size(); ++n) { - LOG_PRINT_L1("WRONG TRANSACTION BLOB, Failed to check tx " << tx_hash << " semantic, rejected"); - tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true; - bad_semantics_txes_lock.lock(); - bad_semantics_txes[0].insert(tx_hash); - if (bad_semantics_txes[0].size() >= BAD_SEMANTICS_TXES_MAX_SIZE) + if (!check_tx_semantic(*tx_info[n].tx, keeped_by_block)) { - std::swap(bad_semantics_txes[0], bad_semantics_txes[1]); - bad_semantics_txes[0].clear(); + set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash); + tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true; + tx_info[n].result = false; + continue; + } + + if (tx_info[n].tx->version < 2) + continue; + const rct::rctSig &rv = tx_info[n].tx->rct_signatures; + switch (rv.type) { + case rct::RCTTypeNull: + // coinbase should not come here, so we reject for all other types + MERROR_VER("Unexpected Null rctSig type"); + set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash); + tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true; + tx_info[n].result = false; + break; + case rct::RCTTypeSimple: + if (!rct::verRctSemanticsSimple(rv)) + { + MERROR_VER("rct signature semantics check failed"); + set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash); + tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true; + tx_info[n].result = false; + break; + } + break; + case rct::RCTTypeFull: + if (!rct::verRct(rv, true)) + { + MERROR_VER("rct signature semantics check failed"); + set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash); + tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true; + tx_info[n].result = false; + break; + } + break; + case rct::RCTTypeBulletproof: + rvv.push_back(&rv); // delayed batch verification + break; + default: + MERROR_VER("Unknown rct type: " << rv.type); + set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash); + tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true; + tx_info[n].result = false; + break; + } + } + if (!rvv.empty() && !rct::verRctSemanticsSimple(rvv)) + { + LOG_PRINT_L1("One transaction among this group has bad semantics, verifying one at a time"); + ret = false; + const bool assumed_bad = rvv.size() == 1; // if there's only one tx, it must be the bad one + for (size_t n = 0; n < tx_info.size(); ++n) + { + if (!tx_info[n].result) + continue; + if (tx_info[n].tx->rct_signatures.type != rct::RCTTypeBulletproof) + continue; + if (assumed_bad || !rct::verRctSemanticsSimple(tx_info[n].tx->rct_signatures)) + { + set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash); + tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true; + tx_info[n].result = false; + } } - bad_semantics_txes_lock.unlock(); - return false; } - return true; + return ret; } //----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- bool core::handle_incoming_txs(const std::vector& tx_blobs, std::vector& tvc, bool keeped_by_block, bool relayed, bool do_not_relay) @@ -769,6 +885,16 @@ namespace cryptonote } waiter.wait(&tpool); + std::vector tx_info; + tx_info.reserve(tx_blobs.size()); + for (size_t i = 0; i < tx_blobs.size(); i++) { + if (!results[i].res) + continue; + tx_info.push_back({&results[i].tx, results[i].hash, tvc[i], results[i].res}); + } + if (!tx_info.empty()) + handle_incoming_tx_accumulated_batch(tx_info, keeped_by_block); + bool ok = true; it = tx_blobs.begin(); for (size_t i = 0; i < tx_blobs.size(); i++, ++it) { @@ -886,36 +1012,6 @@ namespace cryptonote return false; } - if (tx.version >= 2) - { - const rct::rctSig &rv = tx.rct_signatures; - switch (rv.type) { - case rct::RCTTypeNull: - // coinbase should not come here, so we reject for all other types - MERROR_VER("Unexpected Null rctSig type"); - return false; - case rct::RCTTypeSimple: - case rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof: - if (!rct::verRctSemanticsSimple(rv)) - { - MERROR_VER("rct signature semantics check failed"); - return false; - } - break; - case rct::RCTTypeFull: - case rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof: - if (!rct::verRct(rv, true)) - { - MERROR_VER("rct signature semantics check failed"); - return false; - } - break; - default: - MERROR_VER("Unknown rct type: " << rv.type); - return false; - } - } - return true; } //----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- diff --git a/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.h b/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.h index 84e1bb918..497b16214 100644 --- a/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.h +++ b/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.h @@ -864,9 +864,12 @@ namespace cryptonote * @return true if all the checks pass, otherwise false */ bool check_tx_semantic(const transaction& tx, bool keeped_by_block) const; + void set_semantics_failed(const crypto::hash &tx_hash); bool handle_incoming_tx_pre(const blobdata& tx_blob, tx_verification_context& tvc, cryptonote::transaction &tx, crypto::hash &tx_hash, crypto::hash &tx_prefixt_hash, bool keeped_by_block, bool relayed, bool do_not_relay); bool handle_incoming_tx_post(const blobdata& tx_blob, tx_verification_context& tvc, cryptonote::transaction &tx, crypto::hash &tx_hash, crypto::hash &tx_prefixt_hash, bool keeped_by_block, bool relayed, bool do_not_relay); + struct tx_verification_batch_info { const cryptonote::transaction *tx; crypto::hash tx_hash; tx_verification_context &tvc; bool &result; }; + bool handle_incoming_tx_accumulated_batch(std::vector &tx_info, bool keeped_by_block); /** * @copydoc miner::on_block_chain_update diff --git a/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_tx_utils.cpp b/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_tx_utils.cpp index 32031e950..525945079 100644 --- a/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_tx_utils.cpp +++ b/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_tx_utils.cpp @@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ namespace cryptonote // the non-simple version is slightly smaller, but assumes all real inputs // are on the same index, so can only be used if there just one ring. - bool use_simple_rct = sources.size() > 1; + bool use_simple_rct = sources.size() > 1 || range_proof_type == rct::RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof || range_proof_type == rct::RangeProofBulletproof; if (!use_simple_rct) { @@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ namespace cryptonote if (use_simple_rct) tx.rct_signatures = rct::genRctSimple(rct::hash2rct(tx_prefix_hash), inSk, destinations, inamounts, outamounts, amount_in - amount_out, mixRing, amount_keys, msout ? &kLRki : NULL, msout, index, outSk, range_proof_type, hwdev); else - tx.rct_signatures = rct::genRct(rct::hash2rct(tx_prefix_hash), inSk, destinations, outamounts, mixRing, amount_keys, msout ? &kLRki[0] : NULL, msout, sources[0].real_output, outSk, range_proof_type, hwdev); // same index assumption + tx.rct_signatures = rct::genRct(rct::hash2rct(tx_prefix_hash), inSk, destinations, outamounts, mixRing, amount_keys, msout ? &kLRki[0] : NULL, msout, sources[0].real_output, outSk, hwdev); // same index assumption memwipe(inSk.data(), inSk.size() * sizeof(rct::ctkey)); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(tx.vout.size() == outSk.size(), false, "outSk size does not match vout"); diff --git a/src/device/device_ledger.cpp b/src/device/device_ledger.cpp index c4e9e40b7..658b379e4 100644 --- a/src/device/device_ledger.cpp +++ b/src/device/device_ledger.cpp @@ -1354,7 +1354,7 @@ namespace hw { this->exchange(); //pseudoOuts - if ((type == rct::RCTTypeSimple) || (type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)) { + if ((type == rct::RCTTypeSimple) || (type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof)) { for ( i = 0; i < inputs_size; i++) { offset = set_command_header(INS_VALIDATE, 0x01, i+2); //options diff --git a/src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp b/src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp index 2e2b07fcc..2175d1659 100644 --- a/src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp +++ b/src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp @@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ namespace rct { hashes.push_back(hash2rct(h)); keyV kv; - if (rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof || rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof) + if (rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof) { kv.reserve((6*2+9) * rv.p.bulletproofs.size()); for (const auto &p: rv.p.bulletproofs) @@ -651,8 +651,7 @@ namespace rct { // must know the destination private key to find the correct amount, else will return a random number // Note: For txn fees, the last index in the amounts vector should contain that // Thus the amounts vector will be "one" longer than the destinations vectort - rctSig genRct(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const vector & amounts, const ctkeyM &mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, unsigned int index, ctkeyV &outSk, RangeProofType range_proof_type, hw::device &hwdev) { - const bool bulletproof = range_proof_type != RangeProofBorromean; + rctSig genRct(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const vector & amounts, const ctkeyM &mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, unsigned int index, ctkeyV &outSk, hw::device &hwdev) { CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(amounts.size() == destinations.size() || amounts.size() == destinations.size() + 1, "Different number of amounts/destinations"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(amount_keys.size() == destinations.size(), "Different number of amount_keys/destinations"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(index < mixRing.size(), "Bad index into mixRing"); @@ -662,11 +661,10 @@ namespace rct { CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES((kLRki && msout) || (!kLRki && !msout), "Only one of kLRki/msout is present"); rctSig rv; - rv.type = bulletproof ? RCTTypeFullBulletproof : RCTTypeFull; + rv.type = RCTTypeFull; rv.message = message; rv.outPk.resize(destinations.size()); - if (!bulletproof) - rv.p.rangeSigs.resize(destinations.size()); + rv.p.rangeSigs.resize(destinations.size()); rv.ecdhInfo.resize(destinations.size()); size_t i = 0; @@ -675,46 +673,11 @@ namespace rct { for (i = 0; i < destinations.size(); i++) { //add destination to sig rv.outPk[i].dest = copy(destinations[i]); - //compute range proof (bulletproofs are done later) - if (!bulletproof) - { - rv.p.rangeSigs[i] = proveRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, amounts[i]); - #ifdef DBG - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]), "verRange failed on newly created proof"); - #endif - } - } - - rv.p.bulletproofs.clear(); - if (bulletproof) - { - std::vector proof_amounts; - size_t amounts_proved = 0; - while (amounts_proved < amounts.size()) - { - size_t batch_size = 1; - if (range_proof_type == RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof) - while (batch_size * 2 + amounts_proved <= amounts.size()) - batch_size *= 2; - rct::keyV C, masks; - std::vector batch_amounts(batch_size); - for (i = 0; i < batch_size; ++i) - batch_amounts[i] = amounts[i + amounts_proved]; - rv.p.bulletproofs.push_back(proveRangeBulletproof(C, masks, batch_amounts)); + //compute range proof + rv.p.rangeSigs[i] = proveRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, amounts[i]); #ifdef DBG - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs.back()), "verBulletproof failed on newly created proof"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]), "verRange failed on newly created proof"); #endif - for (i = 0; i < batch_size; ++i) - { - rv.outPk[i + amounts_proved].mask = C[i]; - outSk[i + amounts_proved].mask = masks[i]; - } - amounts_proved += batch_size; - } - } - - for (i = 0; i < outSk.size(); ++i) - { //mask amount and mask rv.ecdhInfo[i].mask = copy(outSk[i].mask); rv.ecdhInfo[i].amount = d2h(amounts[i]); @@ -744,7 +707,7 @@ namespace rct { ctkeyM mixRing; ctkeyV outSk; tie(mixRing, index) = populateFromBlockchain(inPk, mixin); - return genRct(message, inSk, destinations, amounts, mixRing, amount_keys, kLRki, msout, index, outSk, RangeProofBorromean, hwdev); + return genRct(message, inSk, destinations, amounts, mixRing, amount_keys, kLRki, msout, index, outSk, hwdev); } //RCT simple @@ -766,35 +729,61 @@ namespace rct { } rctSig rv; - rv.type = bulletproof ? RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof : RCTTypeSimple; + rv.type = bulletproof ? RCTTypeBulletproof : RCTTypeSimple; rv.message = message; rv.outPk.resize(destinations.size()); - if (bulletproof) - rv.p.bulletproofs.resize(destinations.size()); - else + if (!bulletproof) rv.p.rangeSigs.resize(destinations.size()); rv.ecdhInfo.resize(destinations.size()); size_t i; keyV masks(destinations.size()); //sk mask.. outSk.resize(destinations.size()); - key sumout = zero(); for (i = 0; i < destinations.size(); i++) { //add destination to sig rv.outPk[i].dest = copy(destinations[i]); //compute range proof - if (bulletproof) - rv.p.bulletproofs[i] = proveRangeBulletproof(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, outamounts[i]); - else + if (!bulletproof) rv.p.rangeSigs[i] = proveRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, outamounts[i]); #ifdef DBG - if (bulletproof) - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs[i]), "verBulletproof failed on newly created proof"); - else + if (!bulletproof) CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]), "verRange failed on newly created proof"); #endif - + } + + rv.p.bulletproofs.clear(); + if (bulletproof) + { + std::vector proof_amounts; + size_t n_amounts = outamounts.size(); + size_t amounts_proved = 0; + while (amounts_proved < n_amounts) + { + size_t batch_size = 1; + if (range_proof_type == RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof) + while (batch_size * 2 + amounts_proved <= n_amounts && batch_size * 2 <= 16) + batch_size *= 2; + rct::keyV C, masks; + std::vector batch_amounts(batch_size); + for (i = 0; i < batch_size; ++i) + batch_amounts[i] = outamounts[i + amounts_proved]; + rv.p.bulletproofs.push_back(proveRangeBulletproof(C, masks, batch_amounts)); + #ifdef DBG + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs.back()), "verBulletproof failed on newly created proof"); + #endif + for (i = 0; i < batch_size; ++i) + { + rv.outPk[i + amounts_proved].mask = C[i]; + outSk[i + amounts_proved].mask = masks[i]; + } + amounts_proved += batch_size; + } + } + + key sumout = zero(); + for (i = 0; i < outSk.size(); ++i) + { sc_add(sumout.bytes, outSk[i].mask.bytes, sumout.bytes); //mask amount and mask @@ -857,14 +846,10 @@ namespace rct { // must know the destination private key to find the correct amount, else will return a random number bool verRct(const rctSig & rv, bool semantics) { PERF_TIMER(verRct); - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull || rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof, false, "verRct called on non-full rctSig"); - const bool bulletproof = is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull, false, "verRct called on non-full rctSig"); if (semantics) { - if (bulletproof) - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == n_bulletproof_amounts(rv.p.bulletproofs), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and bulletproofs"); - else - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.p.rangeSigs.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.p.rangeSigs"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.p.rangeSigs.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.p.rangeSigs"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.ecdhInfo"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.MGs.size() == 1, false, "full rctSig has not one MG"); } @@ -879,14 +864,10 @@ namespace rct { if (semantics) { tools::threadpool& tpool = tools::threadpool::getInstance(); tools::threadpool::waiter waiter; - std::deque results(bulletproof ? rv.p.bulletproofs.size() : rv.outPk.size(), false); + std::deque results(rv.outPk.size(), false); DP("range proofs verified?"); - if (bulletproof) - for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.p.bulletproofs.size(); i++) - tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i] { results[i] = verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs[i]); }); - else - for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.outPk.size(); i++) - tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i] { results[i] = verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]); }); + for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.outPk.size(); i++) + tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i] { results[i] = verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]); }); waiter.wait(&tpool); for (size_t i = 0; i < results.size(); ++i) { @@ -940,7 +921,7 @@ namespace rct { { CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rvp, false, "rctSig pointer is NULL"); const rctSig &rv = *rvp; - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof, false, "verRctSemanticsSimple called on non simple rctSig"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof, false, "verRctSemanticsSimple called on non simple rctSig"); const bool bulletproof = is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type); if (bulletproof) { @@ -1041,7 +1022,7 @@ namespace rct { { PERF_TIMER(verRctNonSemanticsSimple); - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof, false, "verRctNonSemanticsSimple called on non simple rctSig"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof, false, "verRctNonSemanticsSimple called on non simple rctSig"); const bool bulletproof = is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type); // semantics check is early, and mixRing/MGs aren't resolved yet if (bulletproof) @@ -1101,7 +1082,7 @@ namespace rct { // uses the attached ecdh info to find the amounts represented by each output commitment // must know the destination private key to find the correct amount, else will return a random number xmr_amount decodeRct(const rctSig & rv, const key & sk, unsigned int i, key & mask, hw::device &hwdev) { - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull || rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof, false, "decodeRct called on non-full rctSig"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull, false, "decodeRct called on non-full rctSig"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(i < rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Bad index"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Mismatched sizes of rv.outPk and rv.ecdhInfo"); @@ -1129,7 +1110,7 @@ namespace rct { } xmr_amount decodeRctSimple(const rctSig & rv, const key & sk, unsigned int i, key &mask, hw::device &hwdev) { - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof, false, "decodeRct called on non simple rctSig"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof, false, "decodeRct called on non simple rctSig"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(i < rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Bad index"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Mismatched sizes of rv.outPk and rv.ecdhInfo"); @@ -1157,12 +1138,12 @@ namespace rct { } bool signMultisig(rctSig &rv, const std::vector &indices, const keyV &k, const multisig_out &msout, const key &secret_key) { - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull || rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof || rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof, + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull || rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof, false, "unsupported rct type"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(indices.size() == k.size(), false, "Mismatched k/indices sizes"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(k.size() == rv.p.MGs.size(), false, "Mismatched k/MGs size"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(k.size() == msout.c.size(), false, "Mismatched k/msout.c size"); - if (rv.type == RCTTypeFull || rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof) + if (rv.type == RCTTypeFull) { CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.MGs.size() == 1, false, "MGs not a single element"); } diff --git a/src/ringct/rctSigs.h b/src/ringct/rctSigs.h index d1090ca77..ae8bb91d7 100644 --- a/src/ringct/rctSigs.h +++ b/src/ringct/rctSigs.h @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ namespace rct { //decodeRct: (c.f. https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098 section 5.1.1) // uses the attached ecdh info to find the amounts represented by each output commitment // must know the destination private key to find the correct amount, else will return a random number - rctSig genRct(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const std::vector & amounts, const ctkeyM &mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, unsigned int index, ctkeyV &outSk, RangeProofType range_proof_type, hw::device &hwdev); + rctSig genRct(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const std::vector & amounts, const ctkeyM &mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, unsigned int index, ctkeyV &outSk, hw::device &hwdev); rctSig genRct(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const ctkeyV & inPk, const keyV & destinations, const std::vector & amounts, const keyV &amount_keys, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, const int mixin, hw::device &hwdev); rctSig genRctSimple(const key & message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const ctkeyV & inPk, const keyV & destinations, const std::vector & inamounts, const std::vector & outamounts, const keyV &amount_keys, const std::vector *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, xmr_amount txnFee, unsigned int mixin, hw::device &hwdev); rctSig genRctSimple(const key & message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const std::vector & inamounts, const std::vector & outamounts, xmr_amount txnFee, const ctkeyM & mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const std::vector *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, const std::vector & index, ctkeyV &outSk, RangeProofType range_proof_type, hw::device &hwdev); diff --git a/src/ringct/rctTypes.cpp b/src/ringct/rctTypes.cpp index 72ef75780..e67637af6 100644 --- a/src/ringct/rctTypes.cpp +++ b/src/ringct/rctTypes.cpp @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ // STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF // THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +#include "misc_log_ex.h" #include "rctTypes.h" using namespace crypto; using namespace std; @@ -214,7 +215,7 @@ namespace rct { switch (type) { case RCTTypeSimple: - case RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof: + case RCTTypeBulletproof: return true; default: return false; @@ -225,19 +226,29 @@ namespace rct { { switch (type) { - case RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof: - case RCTTypeFullBulletproof: + case RCTTypeBulletproof: return true; default: return false; } } + size_t n_bulletproof_amounts(const Bulletproof &proof) + { + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() >= 6, 0, "Invalid bulletproof L size"); + return 1 << (proof.L.size() - 6); + } + size_t n_bulletproof_amounts(const std::vector &proofs) { size_t n = 0; for (const Bulletproof &proof: proofs) - n += proof.V.size(); + { + size_t n2 = n_bulletproof_amounts(proof); + if (n2 == 0) + return 0; + n += n2; + } return n; } diff --git a/src/ringct/rctTypes.h b/src/ringct/rctTypes.h index 5574c7784..894f747b8 100644 --- a/src/ringct/rctTypes.h +++ b/src/ringct/rctTypes.h @@ -213,6 +213,7 @@ namespace rct { END_SERIALIZE() }; + size_t n_bulletproof_amounts(const Bulletproof &proof); size_t n_bulletproof_amounts(const std::vector &proofs); //A container to hold all signatures necessary for RingCT @@ -226,8 +227,7 @@ namespace rct { RCTTypeNull = 0, RCTTypeFull = 1, RCTTypeSimple = 2, - RCTTypeFullBulletproof = 3, - RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof = 4, + RCTTypeBulletproof = 3, }; enum RangeProofType { RangeProofBorromean, RangeProofBulletproof, RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof }; struct rctSigBase { @@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ namespace rct { FIELD(type) if (type == RCTTypeNull) return true; - if (type != RCTTypeFull && type != RCTTypeFullBulletproof && type != RCTTypeSimple && type != RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) + if (type != RCTTypeFull && type != RCTTypeSimple && type != RCTTypeBulletproof) return false; VARINT_FIELD(txnFee) // inputs/outputs not saved, only here for serialization help @@ -307,9 +307,9 @@ namespace rct { { if (type == RCTTypeNull) return true; - if (type != RCTTypeFull && type != RCTTypeFullBulletproof && type != RCTTypeSimple && type != RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) + if (type != RCTTypeFull && type != RCTTypeSimple && type != RCTTypeBulletproof) return false; - if (type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof || type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof) + if (type == RCTTypeBulletproof) { ar.tag("bp"); ar.begin_array(); @@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ namespace rct { ar.begin_array(); // we keep a byte for size of MGs, because we don't know whether this is // a simple or full rct signature, and it's starting to annoy the hell out of me - size_t mg_elements = (type == RCTTypeSimple || type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) ? inputs : 1; + size_t mg_elements = (type == RCTTypeSimple || type == RCTTypeBulletproof) ? inputs : 1; PREPARE_CUSTOM_VECTOR_SERIALIZATION(mg_elements, MGs); if (MGs.size() != mg_elements) return false; @@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ namespace rct { for (size_t j = 0; j < mixin + 1; ++j) { ar.begin_array(); - size_t mg_ss2_elements = ((type == RCTTypeSimple || type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) ? 1 : inputs) + 1; + size_t mg_ss2_elements = ((type == RCTTypeSimple || type == RCTTypeBulletproof) ? 1 : inputs) + 1; PREPARE_CUSTOM_VECTOR_SERIALIZATION(mg_ss2_elements, MGs[i].ss[j]); if (MGs[i].ss[j].size() != mg_ss2_elements) return false; @@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ namespace rct { ar.delimit_array(); } ar.end_array(); - if (type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) + if (type == RCTTypeBulletproof) { ar.tag("pseudoOuts"); ar.begin_array(); @@ -416,12 +416,12 @@ namespace rct { keyV& get_pseudo_outs() { - return type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof ? p.pseudoOuts : pseudoOuts; + return type == RCTTypeBulletproof ? p.pseudoOuts : pseudoOuts; } keyV const& get_pseudo_outs() const { - return type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof ? p.pseudoOuts : pseudoOuts; + return type == RCTTypeBulletproof ? p.pseudoOuts : pseudoOuts; } }; diff --git a/src/wallet/wallet2.cpp b/src/wallet/wallet2.cpp index fdba6d84a..37340e22b 100644 --- a/src/wallet/wallet2.cpp +++ b/src/wallet/wallet2.cpp @@ -1142,10 +1142,9 @@ static uint64_t decodeRct(const rct::rctSig & rv, const crypto::key_derivation & switch (rv.type) { case rct::RCTTypeSimple: - case rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof: + case rct::RCTTypeBulletproof: return rct::decodeRctSimple(rv, rct::sk2rct(scalar1), i, mask, hwdev); case rct::RCTTypeFull: - case rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof: return rct::decodeRct(rv, rct::sk2rct(scalar1), i, mask, hwdev); default: LOG_ERROR("Unsupported rct type: " << rv.type); diff --git a/tests/core_tests/CMakeLists.txt b/tests/core_tests/CMakeLists.txt index c8ee7d9db..1ac0e7864 100644 --- a/tests/core_tests/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/tests/core_tests/CMakeLists.txt @@ -41,7 +41,8 @@ set(core_tests_sources transaction_tests.cpp tx_validation.cpp v2_tests.cpp - rct.cpp) + rct.cpp + bulletproofs.cpp) set(core_tests_headers block_reward.h @@ -58,7 +59,8 @@ set(core_tests_headers transaction_tests.h tx_validation.h v2_tests.h - rct.h) + rct.h + bulletproofs.h) add_executable(core_tests ${core_tests_sources} @@ -73,6 +75,7 @@ target_link_libraries(core_tests device ${CMAKE_THREAD_LIBS_INIT} ${EXTRA_LIBRARIES}) +enable_stack_trace(core_tests) set_property(TARGET core_tests PROPERTY FOLDER "tests") diff --git a/tests/core_tests/bulletproofs.cpp b/tests/core_tests/bulletproofs.cpp new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3f2a2567c --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/core_tests/bulletproofs.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,339 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2014-2018, The Monero Project +// +// All rights reserved. +// +// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are +// permitted provided that the following conditions are met: +// +// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of +// conditions and the following disclaimer. +// +// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list +// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other +// materials provided with the distribution. +// +// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be +// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific +// prior written permission. +// +// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY +// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF +// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL +// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, +// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, +// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, +// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF +// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +// +// Parts of this file are originally copyright (c) 2012-2013 The Cryptonote developers + +#include "ringct/rctSigs.h" +#include "ringct/bulletproofs.h" +#include "chaingen.h" +#include "bulletproofs.h" +#include "device/device.hpp" + +using namespace epee; +using namespace crypto; +using namespace cryptonote; + +//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Tests + +bool gen_bp_tx_validation_base::generate_with(std::vector& events, + const int *out_idx, int mixin, size_t n_txes, const uint64_t *amounts_paid, bool valid, const bool *multi_out, + const std::function &sources, std::vector &destinations, size_t tx_idx)> &pre_tx, + const std::function &post_tx) const +{ + uint64_t ts_start = 1338224400; + + GENERATE_ACCOUNT(miner_account); + MAKE_GENESIS_BLOCK(events, blk_0, miner_account, ts_start); + + // create 8 miner accounts, and have them mine the next 8 blocks + cryptonote::account_base miner_accounts[8]; + const cryptonote::block *prev_block = &blk_0; + cryptonote::block blocks[8 + CRYPTONOTE_MINED_MONEY_UNLOCK_WINDOW]; + for (size_t n = 0; n < 8; ++n) { + miner_accounts[n].generate(); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(generator.construct_block_manually(blocks[n], *prev_block, miner_accounts[n], + test_generator::bf_major_ver | test_generator::bf_minor_ver | test_generator::bf_timestamp | test_generator::bf_hf_version, + 2, 2, prev_block->timestamp + DIFFICULTY_BLOCKS_ESTIMATE_TIMESPAN * 2, // v2 has blocks twice as long + crypto::hash(), 0, transaction(), std::vector(), 0, 0, 2), + false, "Failed to generate block"); + events.push_back(blocks[n]); + prev_block = blocks + n; + LOG_PRINT_L0("Initial miner tx " << n << ": " << obj_to_json_str(blocks[n].miner_tx)); + } + + // rewind + cryptonote::block blk_r, blk_last; + { + blk_last = blocks[7]; + for (size_t i = 0; i < CRYPTONOTE_MINED_MONEY_UNLOCK_WINDOW; ++i) + { + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(generator.construct_block_manually(blocks[8+i], blk_last, miner_account, + test_generator::bf_major_ver | test_generator::bf_minor_ver | test_generator::bf_timestamp | test_generator::bf_hf_version, + 2, 2, blk_last.timestamp + DIFFICULTY_BLOCKS_ESTIMATE_TIMESPAN * 2, // v2 has blocks twice as long + crypto::hash(), 0, transaction(), std::vector(), 0, 0, 2), + false, "Failed to generate block"); + events.push_back(blocks[8+i]); + blk_last = blocks[8+i]; + } + blk_r = blk_last; + } + + // create 4 txes from these miners in another block, to generate some rct outputs + std::vector rct_txes; + cryptonote::block blk_txes; + std::vector starting_rct_tx_hashes; + static const uint64_t input_amounts_available[] = {5000000000000, 30000000000000, 100000000000, 80000000000}; + for (size_t n = 0; n < n_txes; ++n) + { + std::vector sources; + + sources.resize(1); + tx_source_entry& src = sources.back(); + + const uint64_t needed_amount = input_amounts_available[n]; + src.amount = input_amounts_available[n]; + size_t real_index_in_tx = 0; + for (size_t m = 0; m < 7; ++m) { + size_t index_in_tx = 0; + for (size_t i = 0; i < blocks[m].miner_tx.vout.size(); ++i) + if (blocks[m].miner_tx.vout[i].amount == needed_amount) + index_in_tx = i; + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(blocks[m].miner_tx.vout[index_in_tx].amount == needed_amount, false, "Expected amount not found"); + src.push_output(m, boost::get(blocks[m].miner_tx.vout[index_in_tx].target).key, src.amount); + if (m == n) + real_index_in_tx = index_in_tx; + } + src.real_out_tx_key = cryptonote::get_tx_pub_key_from_extra(blocks[n].miner_tx); + src.real_output = n; + src.real_output_in_tx_index = real_index_in_tx; + src.mask = rct::identity(); + src.rct = false; + + //fill outputs entry + tx_destination_entry td; + td.addr = miner_accounts[n].get_keys().m_account_address; + std::vector destinations; + for (int o = 0; amounts_paid[o] != (uint64_t)-1; ++o) + { + td.amount = amounts_paid[o]; + destinations.push_back(td); + } + + if (pre_tx && !pre_tx(sources, destinations, n)) + { + MDEBUG("pre_tx returned failure"); + return false; + } + + crypto::secret_key tx_key; + std::vector additional_tx_keys; + std::unordered_map subaddresses; + subaddresses[miner_accounts[n].get_keys().m_account_address.m_spend_public_key] = {0,0}; + rct_txes.resize(rct_txes.size() + 1); + bool r = construct_tx_and_get_tx_key(miner_accounts[n].get_keys(), subaddresses, sources, destinations, cryptonote::account_public_address{}, std::vector(), rct_txes.back(), 0, tx_key, additional_tx_keys, true, multi_out[n] ? rct::RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof : rct::RangeProofBulletproof); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(r, false, "failed to construct transaction"); + + if (post_tx && !post_tx(rct_txes.back(), n)) + { + MDEBUG("post_tx returned failure"); + return false; + } + + //events.push_back(rct_txes.back()); + starting_rct_tx_hashes.push_back(get_transaction_hash(rct_txes.back())); + LOG_PRINT_L0("Test tx: " << obj_to_json_str(rct_txes.back())); + + for (int o = 0; amounts_paid[o] != (uint64_t)-1; ++o) + { + crypto::key_derivation derivation; + bool r = crypto::generate_key_derivation(destinations[o].addr.m_view_public_key, tx_key, derivation); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(r, false, "Failed to generate key derivation"); + crypto::secret_key amount_key; + crypto::derivation_to_scalar(derivation, o, amount_key); + rct::key rct_tx_mask; + if (rct_txes.back().rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeSimple || rct_txes.back().rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof) + rct::decodeRctSimple(rct_txes.back().rct_signatures, rct::sk2rct(amount_key), o, rct_tx_mask, hw::get_device("default")); + else + rct::decodeRct(rct_txes.back().rct_signatures, rct::sk2rct(amount_key), o, rct_tx_mask, hw::get_device("default")); + } + + while (amounts_paid[0] != (size_t)-1) + ++amounts_paid; + ++amounts_paid; + } + if (!valid) + DO_CALLBACK(events, "mark_invalid_tx"); + events.push_back(rct_txes); + + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(generator.construct_block_manually(blk_txes, blk_last, miner_account, + test_generator::bf_major_ver | test_generator::bf_minor_ver | test_generator::bf_timestamp | test_generator::bf_tx_hashes | test_generator::bf_hf_version | test_generator::bf_max_outs, + 8, 8, blk_last.timestamp + DIFFICULTY_BLOCKS_ESTIMATE_TIMESPAN * 2, // v2 has blocks twice as long + crypto::hash(), 0, transaction(), starting_rct_tx_hashes, 0, 6, 8), + false, "Failed to generate block"); + if (!valid) + DO_CALLBACK(events, "mark_invalid_block"); + events.push_back(blk_txes); + blk_last = blk_txes; + + return true; +} + +bool gen_bp_tx_validation_base::check_bp(const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx, const size_t *sizes, const char *context) const +{ + DEFINE_TESTS_ERROR_CONTEXT(context); + CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(tx.version >= 2); + CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(rct::is_rct_bulletproof(tx.rct_signatures.type)); + size_t n_sizes = 0, n_amounts = 0; + for (size_t n = 0; n < tx_idx; ++n) + { + while (sizes[0] != (size_t)-1) + ++sizes; + ++sizes; + } + while (sizes[n_sizes] != (size_t)-1) + n_amounts += sizes[n_sizes++]; + CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.size() == n_sizes); + CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(rct::n_bulletproof_amounts(tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs) == n_amounts); + for (size_t n = 0; n < n_sizes; ++n) + CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(rct::n_bulletproof_amounts(tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs[n]) == sizes[n]); + return true; +} + +bool gen_bp_tx_valid_1::generate(std::vector& events) const +{ + const int mixin = 6; + const int out_idx[] = {1, -1}; + const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {10000, (uint64_t)-1}; + const size_t bp_sizes[] = {1, (size_t)-1}; + const bool multi_out[] = {false}; + return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 1, amounts_paid, true, multi_out, NULL, [&](const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){ return check_bp(tx, tx_idx, bp_sizes, "gen_bp_tx_valid_1"); }); +} + +bool gen_bp_tx_valid_1_1::generate(std::vector& events) const +{ + const int mixin = 6; + const int out_idx[] = {1, -1}; + const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {5000, 5000, (uint64_t)-1}; + const size_t bp_sizes[] = {1, 1, (size_t)-1}; + const bool multi_out[] = {false}; + return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 1, amounts_paid, true, multi_out, NULL, [&](const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){ return check_bp(tx, tx_idx, bp_sizes, "gen_bp_tx_valid_1_1"); }); +} + +bool gen_bp_tx_valid_2::generate(std::vector& events) const +{ + const int mixin = 6; + const int out_idx[] = {1, -1}; + const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {5000, 5000, (uint64_t)-1}; + const size_t bp_sizes[] = {2, (size_t)-1}; + const bool multi_out[] = {true}; + return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 1, amounts_paid, true, multi_out, NULL, [&](const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){ return check_bp(tx, tx_idx, bp_sizes, "gen_bp_tx_valid_2"); }); +} + +bool gen_bp_tx_valid_4_2_1::generate(std::vector& events) const +{ + const int mixin = 6; + const int out_idx[] = {1, -1}; + const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, (uint64_t)-1}; + const size_t bp_sizes[] = {4, 2, 1, (size_t)-1}; + const bool multi_out[] = {true}; + return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 1, amounts_paid, true, multi_out, NULL, [&](const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){ return check_bp(tx, tx_idx, bp_sizes, "gen_bp_tx_valid_4_2_1"); }); +} + +bool gen_bp_tx_valid_16_16::generate(std::vector& events) const +{ + const int mixin = 6; + const int out_idx[] = {1, -1}; + const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, (uint64_t)-1}; + const size_t bp_sizes[] = {16, 16, (size_t)-1}; + const bool multi_out[] = {true}; + return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 1, amounts_paid, true, multi_out, NULL, [&](const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){ return check_bp(tx, tx_idx, bp_sizes, "gen_bp_tx_valid_16_16"); }); +} + +bool gen_bp_txs_valid_2_and_2::generate(std::vector& events) const +{ + const int mixin = 6; + const int out_idx[] = {1, -1}; + const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {1000, 1000, (size_t)-1, 1000, 1000, (uint64_t)-1}; + const size_t bp_sizes[] = {2, (size_t)-1, 2, (size_t)-1}; + const bool multi_out[] = {true}; + return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 2, amounts_paid, true, multi_out, NULL, [&](const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){ return check_bp(tx, tx_idx, bp_sizes, "gen_bp_txs_valid_2_2"); }); +} + +bool gen_bp_txs_valid_1_1_and_8_2_and_16_16_1::generate(std::vector& events) const +{ + const int mixin = 6; + const int out_idx[] = {1, -1}; + const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {1000, 1000, (uint64_t)-1, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, (uint64_t)-1, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, (uint64_t)-1}; + const bool multi_out[] = {false, true, true}; + const size_t bp_sizes[] = {1, 1, (size_t)-1, 8, 2, (size_t)-1, 16, 16, 1, (size_t)-1}; + return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 3, amounts_paid, true, multi_out, NULL, [&](const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){ return check_bp(tx, tx_idx, bp_sizes, "gen_bp_txs_valid_1_1_and_8_2_and_16_16_1"); }); +} + +bool gen_bp_tx_invalid_not_enough_proofs::generate(std::vector& events) const +{ + DEFINE_TESTS_ERROR_CONTEXT("gen_bp_tx_invalid_not_enough_proofs"); + const int mixin = 6; + const int out_idx[] = {1, -1}; + const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {10000, (uint64_t)-1}; + const bool multi_out[] = {false}; + return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 1, amounts_paid, false, multi_out, NULL, [&](cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t idx){ + CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof); + CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(!tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.empty()); + tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.pop_back(); + return true; + }); +} + +bool gen_bp_tx_invalid_too_many_proofs::generate(std::vector& events) const +{ + DEFINE_TESTS_ERROR_CONTEXT("gen_bp_tx_invalid_too_many_proofs"); + const int mixin = 6; + const int out_idx[] = {1, -1}; + const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {10000, (uint64_t)-1}; + const bool multi_out[] = {false}; + return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 1, amounts_paid, false, multi_out, NULL, [&](cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t idx){ + CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof); + CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(!tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.empty()); + tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.push_back(tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.back()); + return true; + }); +} + +bool gen_bp_tx_invalid_wrong_amount::generate(std::vector& events) const +{ + DEFINE_TESTS_ERROR_CONTEXT("gen_bp_tx_invalid_wrong_amount"); + const int mixin = 6; + const int out_idx[] = {1, -1}; + const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {10000, (uint64_t)-1}; + const bool multi_out[] = {false}; + return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 1, amounts_paid, false, multi_out, NULL, [&](cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t idx){ + CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof); + CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(!tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.empty()); + tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.back() = rct::bulletproof_PROVE(1000, rct::skGen()); + return true; + }); +} + +bool gen_bp_tx_invalid_switched::generate(std::vector& events) const +{ + DEFINE_TESTS_ERROR_CONTEXT("gen_bp_tx_invalid_switched"); + const int mixin = 6; + const int out_idx[] = {1, -1}; + const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {5000, 5000, (uint64_t)-1}; + const bool multi_out[] = {false}; + return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 1, amounts_paid, false, multi_out, NULL, [&](cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){ + CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof); + CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.size() == 2); + rct::Bulletproof proof = tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs[0]; + tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs[0] = tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs[1]; + tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs[1] = proof; + return true; + }); +} + diff --git a/tests/core_tests/bulletproofs.h b/tests/core_tests/bulletproofs.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..25d1cbb8b --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/core_tests/bulletproofs.h @@ -0,0 +1,170 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2014-2018, The Monero Project +// +// All rights reserved. +// +// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are +// permitted provided that the following conditions are met: +// +// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of +// conditions and the following disclaimer. +// +// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list +// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other +// materials provided with the distribution. +// +// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be +// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific +// prior written permission. +// +// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY +// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF +// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL +// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, +// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, +// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, +// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF +// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +// +// Parts of this file are originally copyright (c) 2012-2013 The Cryptonote developers + +#pragma once +#include "chaingen.h" + +struct gen_bp_tx_validation_base : public test_chain_unit_base +{ + gen_bp_tx_validation_base() + : m_invalid_tx_index(0) + , m_invalid_block_index(0) + { + REGISTER_CALLBACK_METHOD(gen_bp_tx_validation_base, mark_invalid_tx); + REGISTER_CALLBACK_METHOD(gen_bp_tx_validation_base, mark_invalid_block); + } + + bool check_tx_verification_context(const cryptonote::tx_verification_context& tvc, bool tx_added, size_t event_idx, const cryptonote::transaction& /*tx*/) + { + if (m_invalid_tx_index == event_idx) + return tvc.m_verifivation_failed; + else + return !tvc.m_verifivation_failed && tx_added; + } + + bool check_tx_verification_context(const std::vector& tvcs, size_t tx_added, size_t event_idx, const std::vector& /*txs*/) + { + size_t failed = 0; + for (const cryptonote::tx_verification_context &tvc: tvcs) + if (tvc.m_verifivation_failed) + ++failed; + if (m_invalid_tx_index == event_idx) + return failed > 0; + else + return failed == 0 && tx_added == tvcs.size(); + } + + bool check_block_verification_context(const cryptonote::block_verification_context& bvc, size_t event_idx, const cryptonote::block& /*block*/) + { + if (m_invalid_block_index == event_idx) + return bvc.m_verifivation_failed; + else + return !bvc.m_verifivation_failed; + } + + bool mark_invalid_block(cryptonote::core& /*c*/, size_t ev_index, const std::vector& /*events*/) + { + m_invalid_block_index = ev_index + 1; + return true; + } + + bool mark_invalid_tx(cryptonote::core& /*c*/, size_t ev_index, const std::vector& /*events*/) + { + m_invalid_tx_index = ev_index + 1; + return true; + } + + bool generate_with(std::vector& events, const int *out_idx, int mixin, + size_t n_txes, const uint64_t *amounts_paid, bool valid, const bool *multi_out, + const std::function &sources, std::vector &destinations, size_t)> &pre_tx, + const std::function &post_tx) const; + + bool check_bp(const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx, const size_t *sizes, const char *context) const; + +private: + size_t m_invalid_tx_index; + size_t m_invalid_block_index; +}; + +template<> +struct get_test_options { + const std::pair hard_forks[4] = {std::make_pair(1, 0), std::make_pair(2, 1), std::make_pair(8, 69), std::make_pair(0, 0)}; + const cryptonote::test_options test_options = { + hard_forks + }; +}; + +// valid +struct gen_bp_tx_valid_1 : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base +{ + bool generate(std::vector& events) const; +}; +template<> struct get_test_options: public get_test_options {}; + +struct gen_bp_tx_valid_1_1 : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base +{ + bool generate(std::vector& events) const; +}; +template<> struct get_test_options: public get_test_options {}; + +struct gen_bp_tx_valid_2 : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base +{ + bool generate(std::vector& events) const; +}; +template<> struct get_test_options: public get_test_options {}; + +struct gen_bp_tx_valid_4_2_1 : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base +{ + bool generate(std::vector& events) const; +}; +template<> struct get_test_options: public get_test_options {}; + +struct gen_bp_tx_valid_16_16 : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base +{ + bool generate(std::vector& events) const; +}; +template<> struct get_test_options: public get_test_options {}; + +struct gen_bp_txs_valid_2_and_2 : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base +{ + bool generate(std::vector& events) const; +}; +template<> struct get_test_options: public get_test_options {}; + +struct gen_bp_txs_valid_1_1_and_8_2_and_16_16_1 : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base +{ + bool generate(std::vector& events) const; +}; +template<> struct get_test_options: public get_test_options {}; + +struct gen_bp_tx_invalid_not_enough_proofs : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base +{ + bool generate(std::vector& events) const; +}; +template<> struct get_test_options: public get_test_options {}; + +struct gen_bp_tx_invalid_too_many_proofs : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base +{ + bool generate(std::vector& events) const; +}; +template<> struct get_test_options: public get_test_options {}; + +struct gen_bp_tx_invalid_wrong_amount : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base +{ + bool generate(std::vector& events) const; +}; +template<> struct get_test_options: public get_test_options {}; + +struct gen_bp_tx_invalid_switched : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base +{ + bool generate(std::vector& events) const; +}; +template<> struct get_test_options: public get_test_options {}; + diff --git a/tests/core_tests/chaingen.h b/tests/core_tests/chaingen.h index bbc9edd19..e44bcd37b 100644 --- a/tests/core_tests/chaingen.h +++ b/tests/core_tests/chaingen.h @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, serialized_block, 0xcd); VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, serialized_transaction, 0xce); VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, event_visitor_settings, 0xcf); -typedef boost::variant test_event_entry; +typedef boost::variant, cryptonote::account_base, callback_entry, serialized_block, serialized_transaction, event_visitor_settings> test_event_entry; typedef std::unordered_map map_hash2tx_t; class test_chain_unit_base @@ -263,6 +263,30 @@ bool check_tx_verification_context(const cryptonote::tx_verification_context& tv } //-------------------------------------------------------------------------- template +auto do_check_tx_verification_context(const std::vector& tvcs, size_t tx_added, size_t event_index, const std::vector& txs, t_test_class& validator, int) + -> decltype(validator.check_tx_verification_context(tvcs, tx_added, event_index, txs)) +{ + return validator.check_tx_verification_context(tvcs, tx_added, event_index, txs); +} +//-------------------------------------------------------------------------- +template +bool do_check_tx_verification_context(const std::vector& tvcs, size_t tx_added, size_t /*event_index*/, const std::vector& /*txs*/, t_test_class&, long) +{ + // Default block verification context check + for (const cryptonote::tx_verification_context &tvc: tvcs) + if (tvc.m_verifivation_failed) + throw std::runtime_error("Transaction verification failed"); + return true; +} +//-------------------------------------------------------------------------- +template +bool check_tx_verification_context(const std::vector& tvcs, size_t tx_added, size_t event_index, const std::vector& txs, t_test_class& validator) +{ + // SFINAE in action + return do_check_tx_verification_context(tvcs, tx_added, event_index, txs, validator, 0); +} +//-------------------------------------------------------------------------- +template auto do_check_block_verification_context(const cryptonote::block_verification_context& bvc, size_t event_index, const cryptonote::block& blk, t_test_class& validator, int) -> decltype(validator.check_block_verification_context(bvc, event_index, blk)) { @@ -339,6 +363,26 @@ public: return true; } + bool operator()(const std::vector& txs) const + { + log_event("cryptonote::transaction"); + + std::vector tx_blobs; + std::vector tvcs; + cryptonote::tx_verification_context tvc0 = AUTO_VAL_INIT(tvc0); + for (const auto &tx: txs) + { + tx_blobs.push_back(t_serializable_object_to_blob(tx)); + tvcs.push_back(tvc0); + } + size_t pool_size = m_c.get_pool_transactions_count(); + m_c.handle_incoming_txs(tx_blobs, tvcs, m_txs_keeped_by_block, false, false); + size_t tx_added = m_c.get_pool_transactions_count() - pool_size; + bool r = check_tx_verification_context(tvcs, tx_added, m_ev_index, txs, m_validator); + CHECK_AND_NO_ASSERT_MES(r, false, "tx verification context check failed"); + return true; + } + bool operator()(const cryptonote::block& b) const { log_event("cryptonote::block"); diff --git a/tests/core_tests/chaingen_main.cpp b/tests/core_tests/chaingen_main.cpp index c31655070..f662c68df 100644 --- a/tests/core_tests/chaingen_main.cpp +++ b/tests/core_tests/chaingen_main.cpp @@ -224,6 +224,18 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[]) GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_multisig_tx_invalid_33_1_2_no_threshold); GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_multisig_tx_invalid_33_1_3_no_threshold); + GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_tx_valid_1); + GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_tx_valid_1_1); + GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_tx_valid_2); + GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_tx_valid_4_2_1); + GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_tx_valid_16_16); + GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_txs_valid_2_and_2); + GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_txs_valid_1_1_and_8_2_and_16_16_1); + GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_tx_invalid_not_enough_proofs); + GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_tx_invalid_too_many_proofs); + GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_tx_invalid_wrong_amount); + GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_tx_invalid_switched); + el::Level level = (failed_tests.empty() ? el::Level::Info : el::Level::Error); MLOG(level, "\nREPORT:"); MLOG(level, " Test run: " << tests_count); diff --git a/tests/core_tests/chaingen_tests_list.h b/tests/core_tests/chaingen_tests_list.h index 174610d5d..c12e97f95 100644 --- a/tests/core_tests/chaingen_tests_list.h +++ b/tests/core_tests/chaingen_tests_list.h @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ #include "v2_tests.h" #include "rct.h" #include "multisig.h" +#include "bulletproofs.h" /************************************************************************/ /* */ /************************************************************************/ diff --git a/tests/core_tests/rct.cpp b/tests/core_tests/rct.cpp index 55401c4cb..342c3f1ee 100644 --- a/tests/core_tests/rct.cpp +++ b/tests/core_tests/rct.cpp @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ bool gen_rct_tx_validation_base::generate_with(std::vector& ev CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(r, false, "Failed to generate key derivation"); crypto::secret_key amount_key; crypto::derivation_to_scalar(derivation, o, amount_key); - if (rct_txes[n].rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeSimple || rct_txes[n].rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) + if (rct_txes[n].rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeSimple || rct_txes[n].rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof) rct::decodeRctSimple(rct_txes[n].rct_signatures, rct::sk2rct(amount_key), o, rct_tx_masks[o+n*4], hw::get_device("default")); else rct::decodeRct(rct_txes[n].rct_signatures, rct::sk2rct(amount_key), o, rct_tx_masks[o+n*4], hw::get_device("default")); diff --git a/tests/performance_tests/check_tx_signature.h b/tests/performance_tests/check_tx_signature.h index 693ea1866..79132ccee 100644 --- a/tests/performance_tests/check_tx_signature.h +++ b/tests/performance_tests/check_tx_signature.h @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ public: { if (rct) { - if (m_tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeFull || m_tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof) + if (m_tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeFull) return rct::verRct(m_tx.rct_signatures); else return rct::verRctSimple(m_tx.rct_signatures); diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/bulletproofs.cpp b/tests/unit_tests/bulletproofs.cpp index db14c050a..077e02d5f 100644 --- a/tests/unit_tests/bulletproofs.cpp +++ b/tests/unit_tests/bulletproofs.cpp @@ -78,58 +78,62 @@ TEST(bulletproofs, multi_splitting) { rct::ctkeyV sc, pc; rct::ctkey sctmp, pctmp; + std::vector index; + std::vector inamounts, outamounts; std::tie(sctmp, pctmp) = rct::ctskpkGen(6000); sc.push_back(sctmp); pc.push_back(pctmp); + inamounts.push_back(6000); + index.push_back(1); std::tie(sctmp, pctmp) = rct::ctskpkGen(7000); sc.push_back(sctmp); pc.push_back(pctmp); + inamounts.push_back(7000); + index.push_back(1); const int mixin = 3, max_outputs = 16; for (int n_outputs = 1; n_outputs <= max_outputs; ++n_outputs) { - std::vector amounts; + std::vector outamounts; rct::keyV amount_keys; rct::keyV destinations; rct::key Sk, Pk; uint64_t available = 6000 + 7000; uint64_t amount; - rct::ctkeyM mixRing(mixin+1); + rct::ctkeyM mixRing(sc.size()); //add output for (size_t i = 0; i < n_outputs; ++i) { amount = rct::randXmrAmount(available); - amounts.push_back(amount); + outamounts.push_back(amount); amount_keys.push_back(rct::hash_to_scalar(rct::zero())); rct::skpkGen(Sk, Pk); destinations.push_back(Pk); available -= amount; } - if (!amounts.empty()) - amounts.back() += available; - for (size_t j = 0; j <= mixin; ++j) + for (size_t i = 0; i < sc.size(); ++i) { - for (size_t i = 0; i < sc.size(); ++i) + for (size_t j = 0; j <= mixin; ++j) { if (j == 1) - mixRing[j].push_back(pc[i]); + mixRing[i].push_back(pc[i]); else - mixRing[j].push_back({rct::scalarmultBase(rct::skGen()), rct::scalarmultBase(rct::skGen())}); + mixRing[i].push_back({rct::scalarmultBase(rct::skGen()), rct::scalarmultBase(rct::skGen())}); } } rct::ctkeyV outSk; - rct::rctSig s = rct::genRct(rct::zero(), sc, destinations, amounts, mixRing, amount_keys, NULL, NULL, 1, outSk, rct::RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof, hw::get_device("default")); - ASSERT_TRUE(rct::verRct(s)); + rct::rctSig s = rct::genRctSimple(rct::zero(), sc, destinations, inamounts, outamounts, available, mixRing, amount_keys, NULL, NULL, index, outSk, rct::RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof, hw::get_device("default")); + ASSERT_TRUE(rct::verRctSimple(s)); for (size_t i = 0; i < n_outputs; ++i) { rct::key mask; - rct::decodeRct(s, amount_keys[i], i, mask, hw::get_device("default")); + rct::decodeRctSimple(s, amount_keys[i], i, mask, hw::get_device("default")); ASSERT_TRUE(mask == outSk[i].mask); } }